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Abstract
This paper examines the role of the tax-free income tax threshold in a complex
tax and transfer system consisting of a range of taxes and beneﬁts, each with their
own taper rates and thresholds. Considering a tax and beneﬁt system with beneﬁt
taper rates whereby some beneﬁts are received by income groups other than those
at the bottom of the distribution, it is suggested that a tax-free threshold is not
a necessary requirement to achieve redistribution. Four alternative policy changes,
each involving the elimination of the tax-free threshold in Australia and designed to
achieve approximate revenue neutrality, were examined using the Melbourne Institute
Tax and Transfer Simulator. A range of implications were examined, including labour
supply responses to tax changes, and the eﬀects of policy changes on inequality and
social welfare. The results demonstrate thati ti sp o s s i b l et oe l i m i n a t et h et a x - f r e e
threshold under approximate overall revenue and distribution neutrality, but that it is
impossible to improve labour supply incentives at the same time. In order to achieve
improved incentives, either revenue or distribution neutrality has to be sacriﬁced.
∗We are grateful to Norman Gemmell for prompting us to examine tax reforms involving elimination of
the tax-free threshold in Australia, and Rienk Asscher for comments on an earlier draft. An early version of
the paper was presented at the 2008 Econometric Society Australasian Meeting in Wellington, New Zealand.
11 Introduction
This paper reports behavioural microsimulation results for several tax policy reforms in
which the Australian tax-free threshold is eliminated and adjustments to tax rebates, as
well as marginal income tax rates, are made. The reforms include a ﬂattening of the income
tax rate structure, which is often suggested by those who are in favour of cutting the tax-free
threshold. The simulations allow for potential labour supply responses using the Melbourne
Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator (MITTS).1 A range of inequality and welfare eﬀects
are reported. Such simulations can contribute to rational policy analysis in view of the con-
siderable population heterogeneity and the impossibility of knowing ap r i o r ihow individuals
will respond to policy changes. Information about likely quantitative orders of magnitude
is crucial and, as demonstrated here, labour supply eﬀects may be substantial. The alterna-
tive structures examined concentrate on revenue-neutral comparisons. Simply eliminating
a tax-free threshold without introducing complementary adjustments to other features of
the tax structure would have undesirable budgetary and distributional impacts.2 Without
imposing revenue-neutrality, alternative policies cannot be properly compared.3
A tax-free threshold, below which the income tax rate is zero, is a feature of many tax
systems and was initially motivated largely by equity considerations. However, this feature
is not required in an integrated tax and transfer structure. Those countries without a tax-
free threshold usually have some kind of tax rebate to deal with distributional objectives
for low-income households and individuals. The simultaneous payment of income tax and
receipt of beneﬁts is a common feature of modern tax and transfer systems. Indeed this
can only be avoided by introducing a tax-free threshold at a very high level. Although
such a policy is supported by some commentators4, this could prove diﬃcult to achieve in
1This is described brieﬂyi nA p p e n d i xAa n di nd e t a i li nC r e e d yet al. (2002). Creedy and Kalb
(2006) describe some of the more recently introduced features of MITTS, and Kalb and Lee (2007, 2008)
report updated wage and labour supply estimates underlying the labour supply responses in the behavioural
simulations.
2This statement, as in many policy debates, clearly attaches much weight to the status quo,w h e r e b yt h e
existing sytem is implicitly judged to have desirable properties.
3For example, Saunders (2006, p. xxvi) argues that, ‘At the same time as the top marginal rate is
reduced, the tax-free threshold should be raised to a level above the welfare minimum (subsistence) level ...
it would mean that all taxpayers enjoyed a substantial tax cut’. He does not mention compensating changes
to other forms of revenue or expenditure along with this revenue-reducing reform, so it is unclear how this
policy change would be ﬁnanced and what the impact of this alternative revenue-generating process would
be.
4For example, Saunders and Maley (2006, p. 113) argue that, ‘The principled case for raising the
threshold is that workers should be allowed to earn and retain enough money to meet their own subsistence
needs before any tax is taken away from them.’ However, the principle involved (whether of a basic value
judgement or an eﬃciency criterion) is not actually mentioned. A similar argument for raising the threshold
2a structure with many means-tested beneﬁts involving beneﬁt taper, or withdrawal, rates
such that some beneﬁts are not conﬁned to the lower-income ranges. What really matters in
a complex multi-tax and transfer structure is the overall redistributive eﬀect.5 Raising the
threshold in order to help low-income groups actually has a low ‘target eﬃciency’ in that
it involves at least the same absolute gains by those subject to higher marginal tax rates.
Diﬀerent sides of the debate are clearly recognised in the summary by Freebairn (1998, p.
67), who suggested that,
Removing the tax-free threshold for many taxpayers would enable funding lower
marginal tax rates, and hence lower eﬃciency costs. But equity concerns almost
certainly will require the addition of a means tested threshold or grant. With-
drawal of the grant can only mean higher eﬀective marginal rates, and greater
distortions, for those on low and middle incomes. Given the distribution of tax
payable with the present system, and stated intentions not to disadvantage those
on low incomes, it is diﬃcult to envisage a tax rate schedule without a tax-free
threshold which is not regressive.
However, as the following analysis shows, careful consideration of practical design aspects
of taxes and transfers, using a microsimulation model, makes it possible to achieve an
elimination of the tax-free threshold which is both approximately distribution and revenue
neutral, although marginal eﬀective tax rates for middle to higher incomes are increased.
Few countries have adopted an income tax structure without a tax-free threshold. An
exception is New Zealand. However, the use of personal allowances meant that there was an
eﬀective tax-free threshold from the introduction of the income tax in 1891 until 1972. There
is now a relatively broad base, with a range of tax rebates for low incomes, a combination of
diﬀerent means-tested transfer payments and a progressive, or graduated, marginal income
tax rate structure. For discussion of the tax reform changes in New Zealand, see Stevens
(1990).
was made by Veit-Wilson (1999), who showed that in practice in the UK there had been no coordination
between those responsible for tax thresholds and those responsible for setting beneﬁt levels.
5An early clear statement of this view was made by Hicks (1946, p. 150) who dated its realisation from
the last quarter of the 19th century: ‘Instead of regarding each tax separately, and attempting the impossible
task of choosing only those taxes which would pass all the tests, it was suddenly realized that any desired
distributional result could be obtained by a compensatory structure of taxes, in which the faults of one
would be oﬀset by the virtues of another’. Hicks then made the point that expenditures, as well as taxes,
also need to be taken into account.
3In Australia, where there has been limited indexation of tax thresholds over many years6,
there have been calls to increase the tax-free threshold as a way of helping low-income groups.
But, as mentioned above, such an increase gives at least the same beneﬁts to higher-rate
taxpayers. The question is how might elimination of the Australian tax-free threshold be
achieved with minimal impacts on lower-income groups? One alternative may be to abolish
the tax-free income range and replace this with a similar amount in rebates for lower income
individuals. The remaining funds could be used to pay for a reduction in the middle income
tax rates to compensate those on middle and higher incomes (outside of the range of the
new rebate) at least partly. Such a policy change could be expected to result in labour
supply eﬀects, since high-level rebates extend further up the income scale and thus lead
to higher eﬀective marginal rates for all people who have income in the extended rebate
withdrawal range. In addition, higher taxes are expected for middle to high income groups
if the increase in tax base is not suﬃcient to allow tax rates to be reduced by a large enough
amount to compensate each individual fully for the loss of the tax-free income range.
Determining a revenue-neutral policy change that abolishes the tax-free income range
is complex, which is at least partly due to the diﬃculty of determining potential labour
supply responses with a range of eﬀects working in opposite directions. A proper analysis
requires a microsimulation model to evaluate the hypothetical policy options and enable full
inclusion of all aspects of the reform.
In order to clarify some features of a policy change involving elimination of the tax-free
threshold, Section 2 considers a simpliﬁed tax and transfer system which however represents
the main features of the Australian and other tax and transfer systems. The alternative
policies are described in Section 3. Policy simulations for Australia are reported in Section
4, using the Melbourne Institute’s behavioural microsimulation model MITTS. Conclusions
are in Section 5.
2 Abolition of the Tax-Free Threshold in a Simpliﬁed
Tax Structure
Consider a simpliﬁed tax structure involving the taxation of individuals, as shown in Figure
1. The income tax involves a tax-free threshold of a,a b o v ew h i c hi n c o m ei st a x e da taﬁxed
6In Australia, no indexation has taken place from 2000/2001 up to 2003/2004, when the tax thresholds
were increased slightly, and again in 2004/2005. In 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 larger increases were intro-
duced, particularly for the top two tax thresholds. The tax-free income threshold has not changed since
2000/2001. Before the July 2000 change, there was no indexation over a long period.
4rate, t.T h e r ei sas i n g l eb e n e ﬁt, or transfer payment, having a taper rate s,w h e r et<s<1,
and a range of ‘free’ income before the taper begins to apply. Furthermore, the receipt of the
transfer payment extends beyond y = a. In Figure 1, the relationship between net (after tax
and transfers) income and gross income is shown by the piecewise-linear schedule ABCD.
T h ed i a g r a mc o n c e n t r a t e so nt h el o w e rr a n g e so ft h ei n c o m ed i s t r i b u t i o n . T or e d u c et h e
number of parameters involved, it is assumed that the taper-free range of the beneﬁti st h e
same as the tax-free range of the income tax structure, equal to a. Although in practice, tax
and transfer systems are usually highly complex, with numerous overlapping beneﬁts, each
with its own thresholds, the simple form shown in Figure 1 is a reasonable approximation

























Figure 1: A Stylised Tax and Transfer System
In the pre-reform situation, suppose the beneﬁt received when y =0is equal to B (0) = b.
As continuity is imposed on the relationship, the point B in Figure 1 must correspond to
a net income of z = a + b. Furthermore the segment BC, when continued to the net
income axis, must have an intercept of b + as.7 The threshold income yT,a b o v ew h i c ht h e
means-tested beneﬁt is exhausted and individuals only pay income tax, is given by:
at +( 1− t)yT =( b + as + at)+( 1− s − t)yT (1)







For those between B and C, the net transfer, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between their net
income z and their income after the payment of income tax alone, is given by:
z − y = {b + as + at +( 1− s − t)y} − y
= b − (s + t)(y − a) (3)
A reform involving the elimination of the tax-free threshold in the income tax would
generate extra revenue. The latter could be used to reduce the income tax rate to t0.I n
addition, a tax rebate could be introduced in order to maintain the section AB. Individuals,
who previously paid no tax as they were below the tax-free threshold a, would need to
receive a tax rebate of t0y up to a maximum of t0a. The tax rebate would have a taper rate
str applying above a. This taper rate can be chosen so that the tax rebate is exhausted at
t h es a m et i m ea st h eb e n e ﬁt b at threshold yT.8 This reform implies that individuals with
gross income between a and yT face a higher eﬀective marginal tax rate than before; that
is, people formerly subject to the means-tested taper rate s now face an additional taper
rate str corresponding to the withdrawal of the tax rebate. This system is shown in Figure
2. The point C moves downward to C0 due to the introduction of the new taper rate str,
which needs to be larger than the reduction in the income tax rate. Again the reform is not
completely distribution-neutral. The overall eﬀect on net income inequality is not obvious
as it depends on the pre-tax income distribution.
Even in such stylised structures the condition required for revenue-neutrality is complex
because of the nonlinearities involved, so that closed-form solutions for new parameter
values, such as t0, are not available. Furthermore, the labour supply implications of this
type of piecewise-linear tax and transfer system are complex, particularly because of the non-
convexities in individuals’ budget sets arising from the reduction in the eﬀective marginal tax
rate as entitlement to the means-tested beneﬁt is exhausted.9 The overall eﬀect is unclear
ap r i o r ias it depends on the initial distribution of income and the balance of income and
substitution eﬀects. This reform involves a minimum of changes — adjusting t while keeping
net incomes of low-income individuals unchanged — and of course it would be possible to
modify other parameters.
8This is not a necessary constraint but it limits the number of parameters involved.





























Hence, despite the simplicity of the structure described above, it is not easy to design
policy changes involving elimination of the tax-free threshold which are both revenue and
distribution neutral. Furthermore, arguments for cutting the threshold are often accompa-
nied by proposals for ﬂattening the income tax rate structure, adding a further complication.
Practical policy analysis requires the use of a behavioural microsimulation model, capable
of dealing with the full complexity of the many elements of the tax and transfer system and
the considerable degree of population heterogeneity, as well as labour supply behaviour. It
is also useful to consider a range of implications of the policy changes for which summary
measures can be computed. This provides information which people can use to form their
own judgements.
3 Description of Four Hypothetical Policy Changes
Four alternative policy changes are examined here, each involving the elimination of the
tax-free threshold. In ﬁnding the (approximately) revenue neutral tax rates, a process of
trial and error was necessary. Only integer tax rates were considered.10 Adjustments were
10The costs of reducing separately each of the marginal tax rates by one percentage point were found to
be approximately 1.4 billion dollars for the 17 per cent tax rate, 1.5 billion dollars for the 30 per cent tax
7made to the rates, rather than the tax thresholds. Detailed descriptions of each of the four
policy changes are given in this section. The income tax structures and other features of the
four policies are listed in Table 1, which gives the marginal tax rates applying between the
relevant thresholds in the current structure and in the four alternative policies considered.
These involve adjustments to the Low Income Tax Oﬀset and Pension Rebate, the details
of which are given in Appendix B.
Table 1: Marginal Tax Rates (Per Cent) and Other Features of Each Policy
Annual income range (in AU$) Initial Rates in policy:
t a x r a t e 1 234
1 0 - 6000 0 17 17 17 17
2 6000 - 21600 17 17 17 17 17
3 21600 - 52000 30 27 28 30 29
4 52000 - 62500 42 42 38 30 29
5 over 62500 47 47 47 31 30
Availability of additional features:
Extended Low Income Tax Oﬀset yes yes no no
Pension Rebate top-up no yes no no
3.1 Policy 1
First, the tax-free threshold is eliminated and everyone earning less than $21,600 in 2003/04
is compensated with an additional Low Income Tax Oﬀset of $1,020 (added to the $235 that
was available in 2003/04). This policy corresponds to going from Figure 1 to Figure 2 in
Section 2. This oﬀ-set of $1,020 corresponds to 17 per cent of $6,000, which under Policy
1 is paid in additional tax. The remaining excess revenue collected from the higher-income
earners is used to reduce the middle income tax rate from 30 to 27 per cent. This policy
change is designed to be approximately revenue neutral under ﬁxed labour supply. Assuming
ﬁxed labour supply, the amount of Pension Rebates decreases by $19.6 million for couples.
Furthermore, 63,000 fewer individuals receive it.11 T h i sa r i s e sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a tu n l i k eo t h e r
rebates, excess Pension Rebate (relative to income tax payable) can be transferred from one
partner to the other within a couple family. This is done without taking other rebates
rate, 200 million dollars for the 42 per cent tax rate and 500 million dollars for the 47 tax rate. These are
only indicative values at the margin and they assume ﬁxed labour supply. The cost of further reducing the
marginal tax rates is not expected to be linear.
11These aggregate amounts are obtained by multiplying the sample numbers by their sample weights,
provided by the SIHC.
8into account.12 Based on the 2003/04 Survey of Income and Housing Costs (SIHC) sample,
127,000 persons on an individual gross income below $21,600 are expected to experience
a decrease in their individual net income following the decrease in their Pension Rebate.13
This is due to the fact that less Pension Rebate can be transferred to them by their partner
after the tax increase.
Although some individuals are expected to be worse oﬀ after the elimination of the tax-
free threshold, the fact that as many as 127,000 of them would have an individual income
below $21,600 is an unexpected result. This is of concern because the aim of this policy
change is to eliminate the tax-free threshold, while making sure low-income earners are fully
compensated through the extension of the Low Income Tax Oﬀset. This is an example of
t h et y p eo fi n t e r a c t i o nb e t w e e nt a xa n db e n e ﬁt structures that is not immediately obvious
when considering separate components.
3.2 Policy 2
The second policy change is a small variation on Policy 1 which attempts to compensate
for the reduction in the Pension Rebate for some low-income couples under Policy 1. It is
diﬃcult to compensate the pension recipients who lose income without overcompensating
other income units or applying arbitrary changes. In Policy 2, the Low Income Tax Oﬀset is
increased as in Policy 1. In addition, the extra revenue generated from the elimination of the
tax-free threshold is used to provide low-income partnered pension recipients with a Pension
Rebate top-up, even though this means some other pension recipients are overcompensated
as a result. The Pension Rebate, which is $304 per year for couples, is increased by $1,020
to compensate them. This beneﬁts only partnered pension recipients. The remaining extra
revenue is less than in Policy 1. Therefore, the middle income tax rate can only be reduced
from 30 to 28 per cent. The remaining extra revenue is enough to lower the 42 per cent
tax rate to 38 per cent. Again, the policy change is designed to be approximately revenue
neutral under ﬁxed labour supply.
3.3 Policy 3
The third policy change considers the elimination of the tax-free threshold accompanied by
a reduction in the top two tax rates without increasing the Low Income Tax Oﬀset. The
12See Appendix B for details. For details of the wide range of beneﬁts in Australia, see Australian
Government Department of Family and Community Services (2004). For details on taxes and rebates, see
Australian Taxation Oﬃce (2006).
13The unweighted number in the SIHC is 187.
942 per cent tax rate is reduced to 30 per cent and the 47 per cent tax rate is reduced to
31 per cent. This ensures that the policy change is approximately revenue neutral under
ﬁxed labour supply. Only high-income earners beneﬁt from these tax cuts and the amount
provided is unbounded, depending only on taxable income. As a result, very high income
earners could be compensated by much more than they lost as a result of the elimination
of the tax-free threshold.
3.4 Policy 4
The simulation results presented below show that, although Policy 3 is revenue neutral
with ﬁxed labour supply, the allowance for labour supply responses produces a substantial
increase in total net revenue. This is because Policy 3 generates a substantial increase in
labour supply, which translates into a large increase in net government revenue. In Policy 4,
this extra revenue is used to reduce the three top income tax rates further, so that revenue
neutrality is restored after allowing for labour supply responses. The 30 and 42 per cent
tax rates are each reduced to 29 per cent and the 47 per cent tax rate is reduced to 30 per
cent.
4 Simulation Results
The Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator (MITTS) is used in this section to
examine the eﬀects of the hypothetical policy changes described above: see Appendix A
for a brief summary of the model. The SIHC for 2003/2004 was used as the database in
the analyses in this paper. Hence the tax and beneﬁt changes examined apply to rates and
thresholds in that year. The main aggregate summary measures are reported in subsection
4.1, and subsections 4.2 and 4.3 consider labour supply and welfare changes respectively.
4.1 Summary of Aggregate Eﬀects
Table 2 summarises the aggregate results for each of the four policies examined, separately
for four demographic groups. Separate econometric estimates of preference functions are
available within MITTS for each of the demographic groups. For couples, the ﬁrst amount
for the average hours change relates to the male partner while the second amount is for the
female partner.
Aggregate eﬀects of the policy changes are calculated by adding all equivalent variations
(EV), compensating variations (CV) and net incomes across all income units, using the
10Table 2: Summary of Aggregate Results (Million Dollars per Year)




N e tg o v tr e v e n u e( ﬁxed labour supply) 92 -32 -38 -9 13
Net govt revenue (variable lab. sup.) 61 -29 -33 0 -1
Average hours (in hours per week) 0.00/0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01
Aggregate net income -130 30 37 18 -44
Compensating variation 91 -32 -38 -9 11
Equivalent variation 91 -32 -38 -9 12
Diﬀ b/w net inc change and EV (in %) -30.3 6.3 2.8 -52.2 -73.9
Policy 2
Change in:
N e tg o v tr e v e n u e( ﬁxed labour supply) -113 86 54 12 40
Net govt revenue (variable lab. sup.) -163 69 47 -5 -53
Average hours (in hours per week) -0.03/-0.07 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01
Aggregate net income 41 -112 -68 -20 -159
Compensating variation -119 86 54 11 33
Equivalent variation -118 86 54 12 34
Diﬀ b/w net inc change and EV (in %) 187.2 -22.7 -20.3 -43.1 -78.8
Policy 3
Change in:
N e tg o v tr e v e n u e( ﬁxed labour supply) -1,595 573 824 372 174
Net govt revenue (variable lab. sup.) 0 910 1,023 419 2,352
Average hours (in hours per week) 0.30/-0.05 0.28 0.24 0.13 0.17
Aggregate net income 4,477 -25 -516 -319 3,617
Compensating variation -2,108 573 807 367 -362
Equivalent variation -1,868 573 837 374 -84
Diﬀ b/w net inc change and EV (in %) -58.3 2165.7 62.1 17.4 -97.7
Policy 4
Change in:
N e tg o v tr e v e n u e( ﬁxed labour supply) -3,302 246 637 319 -2,100
Net govt revenue (variable lab. sup.) -1,574 611 850 391 278
Average hours (in hours per week) 0.34/0.00 0.32 0.26 0.22 0.21
Aggregate net income 6,536 362 -302 -244 6,352
Compensating variation -3,875 246 618 313 -2,699
Equivalent variation -3,597 246 652 322 -2,377
Diﬀ b/w net inc change and EV (in %) -45.0 -167.9 116.1 31.8 -62.6
11survey weights provided with the SIHC data to obtain population level results. A positive
v a l u ef o rt h ec o m p e n s a t i n go re q u i v a l e n tv a r i a t i o ni n d i c a t e saw e l f a r el o s s . I nt e r m so f
social evaluations, the focus on aggregate amounts can be regarded as equivalent to the
assumption of zero relative inequality aversion.
The results show that Policies 1 and 2 imply very small changes. This is because low-
income households are almost fully compensated by the additional Low Income Tax Oﬀset.
As a result, their labour supply responses are negligible and both policy changes are approx-
imately revenue neutral under both ﬁxed and ﬂexible labour supply assumptions. In Policy
1, couples appear to be the only demographic group losing from the policy change in terms
of aggregate net income and welfare. As explained in Section 4.1.1, this is due to the Pension
Rebate being held constant. In addition, they are more likely to be on a higher income than
other groups and are therefore less likely to be fully compensated. By contrast, couples are
the only demographic group to see an increase in their aggregate net income and welfare
under Policy 2 because they are the only demographic group to beneﬁt from the increase
in the Pension Rebate (and some couples are actually overcompensated). In addition, they
also beneﬁt more from the reduction in the fourth tax rate, since they tend to have higher
incomes than other demographic groups.
The results for Policies 3 and 4 show that labour supply responses are expected to be
substantial if the elimination of the tax-free threshold is accompanied by reductions in the
top tax rates instead of an increase in the Low Income Tax Oﬀset. Labour supply responses
are discussed in more detail in the next subsection. Following the large increase in labour
supply, Policy 3, which is approximately revenue neutral under ﬁxed labour supply, leads
t oas i g n i ﬁcant increase in net government revenue. Aggregate net income and welfare
increase for couples but other demographic groups are worse oﬀ after the policy change (the
only exception is an increase in aggregate net income for single men under Policy 4). This
indicates that couples beneﬁt more than other demographic groups from the decreases in
the top tax rates.
Summary information regarding winners and losers by income unit decile, while taking
into account the predicted labour response, is reported in Table 3 for Policies 1 and 4. There
is a sharp contrast between Policy 1, in which low income households are compensated, and
Policy 4, in which they are not compensated. Under Policy 1, virtually none of the income
u n i t si nt h eb o t t o mt h r e ed e c i l e sl o s e ,w h i l et h ep r o p o r t i o no fl o s e r sg o e su pw i t hi n c o m e
level. The elimination of the tax-free threshold is not entirely compensated by the tax cuts
for high-income households under Policy 1. The net income gains for low-income households
12Table 3: Winners and Losers by Income Unit Decile
Decilea Percentage of Ave. change in adult- Number of
population who: equivalent (in $/year) individuals
Stay (000s)
Loseb equal Winb Net inc EV
Policy 1
1 0.0 80.3 19.7 32.08 -0.06 1,188
2 0.0 90.2 9.8 10.95 -0.25 1,569
3 0.7 73.6 25.8 20.11 -6.98 1,836
4 11.8 37.1 51.1 2.61 3.93 2,322
5 28.9 10.4 60.7 -5.80 7.82 2,207
6 33.1 4.0 62.9 38.89 -38.81 2,122
7 39.7 1.2 59.1 21.26 -28.02 2,204
8 48.7 1.1 50.1 1.55 -13.23 2,108
9 68.3 2.5 29.2 -51.64 28.31 1,973
10 89.2 0.4 10.4 -102.31 71.15 1,986
Total 34.1 25.7 40.3 -4.45 1.96 19,516
Policy 4
1 53.1 38.6 8.3 -269.68 481.07 1,188
2 61.7 36.8 1.6 -169.05 222.59 1,569
3 77.8 19.5 2.7 -349.93 456.68 1,836
4 91.7 4.4 3.9 -393.27 610.18 2,322
5 85.4 0.8 13.8 -432.04 679.14 2,207
6 77.0 0.2 22.9 -131.86 502.35 2,122
7 71.4 0.0 28.6 62.55 308.12 2,204
8 66.4 0.1 33.5 208.28 130.62 2,108
9 48.5 0.4 51.1 917.52 -547.99 1,973
10 13.7 0.2 86.1 5,668.39 -5,222.93 1,986
Total 66.1 7.9 26.2 526.28 -243.87 19,516
Notes:
a) Income unit deciles are based on net income unit income per adult
equivalent (before the policy change).
b) Winners are individuals whose net income unit income per adult equivalent
goes up by more than $1 per year. Likewise, losers experience a decrease in
their net income unit income per adult equivalent of more than $1 per year.
13are achieved through an increase in labour supply (see the next subsection), which explains
the limited welfare gains. By contrast, the decrease in net income for high-income households
is partly caused by a reduction in labour supply, which limits their welfare losses.
The picture is quite diﬀerent under Policy 4. A large number of low-income households
lose from the policy change in terms of net income, because they are no longer compensated
t h r o u g ha ni n c r e a s ei nt h eL o wI n c o m eT a xO ﬀset. Furthermore, the reduction in net
income for households in the bottom deciles underestimates their welfare loss due to the
increase in labour supply. The main winners are high-income households. They beneﬁt
the most from the reductions in the top tax rates. The gains are particularly large for the
households belonging to the top decile.
4.2 Labour Supply Response
Table 4 summarises the labour supply responses by males and females for Policies 1 and
4. Under Policy 1, the increase in the labour supply of low-income households is inﬂuenced
mainly by the reduction in the middle income tax rate from 30 to 27 per cent. For higher-
income deciles this eﬀect is likely to be oﬀset by the impact of the elimination of the tax-free
threshold, as the additional rebate is withdrawn at a rate of 4 per cent. Hence, so that the
proportions of individuals reducing their labour supply become larger than the proportions
of those increasing their labour supply. Middle-income households also face a higher eﬀective
marginal tax rate since the increased Low Income Tax Oﬀset is tapered out over a larger
range of their income.
Under Policy 4, the increase in the labour supply of low-income households is a result of
the uncompensated elimination of the tax-free threshold, which has a direct negative impact
on their net income. Moving up in the income distribution, both decreases and increases in
labour supply arise for large proportions of the population. The decrease in tax rates means
that at high income levels, the income eﬀect allows individuals to maintain their level of
net income while working fewer hours. However, there is a substitution eﬀect leading to an
increase in labour supply due to the lower marginal tax rates. The combination of these
two eﬀects leads to the mixed picture regarding the labour supply responses of high-income
households presented in the table.
4.3 Inequality and Welfare Changes
The four policies discussed in this analysis are also expected to aﬀect income distribution
and welfare; in particular, Policy 3 and Policy 4 appear likely to aﬀect these two measures.
14Table 4: Labour Supply Responses by Income Unit Decile
Men Women
Change in hours Change in hours
(per cent) Number (per cent) Number
Decile Less None more (000s) Less None more (000s)
Policy 1
1 0.0 81.5 18.5 552 0.0 85.7 14.3 524
2 0.0 94.3 5.7 601 0.1 94.2 5.7 772
3 0.4 93.8 5.8 574 0.3 90.1 9.6 754
4 5.5 89.0 5.5 700 1.3 89.7 9.0 833
5 9.9 85.9 4.3 701 3.1 88.0 8.9 779
6 9.2 87.8 3.1 729 5.2 87.4 7.4 713
7 14.7 81.9 3.4 756 11.7 79.4 8.9 739
8 16.0 80.7 3.3 805 13.8 78.7 7.5 750
9 21.7 75.0 3.2 811 19.6 74.0 6.4 744
10 18.1 79.0 2.9 891 20.3 76.1 3.6 753
Total 10.6 84.3 5.1 7,122 7.7 84.4 8.0 7,361
Policy 4
1 3.4 53.1 43.5 552 1.3 66.1 32.7 524
2 0.9 88.1 11.0 601 0.6 93.0 6.4 772
3 2.7 78.5 18.8 574 3.1 82.1 14.8 754
4 8.4 68.5 23.1 700 7.6 76.8 15.6 833
5 12.2 60.4 27.4 701 16.3 58.8 24.8 779
6 12.9 54.0 33.1 729 17.5 55.5 27.0 713
7 22.0 43.8 34.2 756 28.0 42.5 29.4 739
8 23.5 45.4 31.2 805 30.4 40.5 29.1 750
9 19.0 46.3 34.7 811 29.2 43.5 27.2 744
10 22.1 52.1 25.9 891 31.9 45.8 22.3 753
Total 13.8 57.6 28.5 7,122 16.9 60.6 22.5 7,361
15As explained in Appendix A, MITTS uses a discrete hours labour supply model. Appendix C
brieﬂy describes the method of computing welfare changes for each individual in a discrete
hours context.14 The behavioural simulations produce a frequency distribution of post-
reform hours for each individual, conditional on the individual’s optimal pre-reform hours
being equal to observed (discretised) hours. This ﬂows on to the welfare calculation, so that
consequently a frequency distribution of welfare changes is obtained for each individual,
from which the expected welfare change is then calculated as the arithmetic mean value.
Again, this is the mean of a conditional distribution.
This information can be used to obtain excess tax burdens and marginal welfare costs for
each income unit. Direct comparisons of welfare changes and net income changes can also
be made.15 Population-level evaluations of welfare necessarily involve value judgements, so
that a decision must be made regarding the social evaluation method. Any evaluation for a
broad group of income units necessarily involves comparisons of units of diﬀe r e n ts i z ea n d
composition. Value judgements concern three aspects: the welfare metric, the deﬁnition of
t h eu n i to fa n a l y s i sa n dt h ef o r mo ft h es o c i a lw e l f a r ef u n c t i o nt ob eu s e d . T h el a t t e ri s
closely related to value judgements regarding inequality aversion and the implied inequality
measure. Diﬀerent values of inequality aversion are used in the analyses in this paper. The
reported results are based on the use of money metric utility per adult equivalent, using
the Whiteford equivalence scales reported by Binh and Whiteford (1990), and using the
individual as the unit of analysis.16
The steps in the social evaluation are as follows. For each income unit, the initial money
metric utility, M0, is obtained, using pre-reform taxes as ‘reference prices’; this is equal to
full income under the pre-reform system. Given the approach used to calculate EV and
CV, taking into account the non-linearity and non-convexity of the budget constraint, M0
is calculated in a way that is consistent with this approach. For each income unit, the
net income at 80 hours of work by all adult members of the income unit under pre-reform
taxes is calculated. Assuming that 80 hours is the maximum number of hours that can be
worked per week, this net income represents full income for the income unit. Then, given the
expected equivalent variation, EV, resulting from the reform, expected post-reform money
metric utility is computed as M1 = M0 − EV.
14More detail on the approach can be found in Creedy and Kalb (2005b) and in Creedy, Hérault and
Kalb (2007).
15For individuals whose labour supply is ﬁxed, for example those who are not in the labour market, the
money measure of the welfare change is equal to the net income change.
16It is recognised that the results can be inﬂuenced by the choice of adult equivalence scales and unit of
analysis, but these are of secondary importance here.
16For each income unit, the adult equivalent size, s, is obtained using equivalence scales,
a n dt h i si nt u r ni su s e dt oc o m p u t em o n e ym e t r i cu t i l i t yp e ra d u l te q u i v a l e n t ,mji,w h e r ej
refers to the tax structure and i refers to the income unit. The distributions of pre-reform
and post-reform money metric can be used to calculate social evaluations.
In computing inequality measures with the individual as the unit of analysis, each value
of mji is weighted by the actual number of persons in the income unit, ni. This paper uses
Atkinson’s inequality measure, A(ε),w h e r eε is the degree of relative inequality aversion.
The inequality measure is expressed as 1 minus the ratio of the equally distributed equivalent
value to the arithmetic mean. The equally distributed equivalent value is the value which,
if obtained by everyone, gives the same social welfare as the actual distribution. Using
an additive welfare function based on constant relative inequality aversion, the equally













In the present context an adjustment must be made for the weighting by the number
of persons in each household. Results can be obtained for a range of inequality aversion
parameters, ε. Finally, social welfare in each system is obtained using the abbreviated
welfare function, Wj =¯ mj (1 − A(ε)), which is associated with the Atkinson inequality
measure (and where ¯ mj is the arithmetic mean value of the money metric utility per adult
equivalent, mji). It is then possible to compare results based on money metric utility with
those obtained using net incomes in the social welfare function.
The ﬁrst four columns in Table 5 provide information about the eﬀects of the four policies
on inequality, using a range of Atkinson measures and the Gini inequality index, based on
both net income and the money metric measure of utility. As expected, the changes are
fairly small under Policies 1 and 2. Only a minor decrease in inequality is observed, which
is due to the reduction in net income for some high-income households. Note that the use of
net income produces somewhat higher reductions in inequality than the use of money metric
utility. This arises due to the failure to value leisure time in measures based on net income
only. In contrast, the changes associated with Policies 3 and 4 are much more substantial.
As expected, both policies generate large increases in inequality. For the same reason as in
Policies 1 and 2, the use of net income produces higher increases in inequality than the use
of money metric utility.
Table 5 shows that the magnitude of the percentage increases in Atkinson’s index
17decreases with increasing relative inequality aversion. As the inequality aversion parameter
decreases, the Atkinson index becomes more sensitive to changes in the upper end of the
income (or money metric) distribution, where the changes are the largest in absolute terms.
As a result, the changes in the Atkinson index become larger. This also explains why the
Atkinson index is more sensitive to ε in policies 3 and 4, where the top tax rates are lowered,
resulting in the largest absolute changes at the upper end of the distribution.17
Table 5: Inequality and Social Welfare Measures
Atkinson’s index Mean Social Welfare
ε =0 .2 ε =0 .8 ε =1 .4 Gini value ε =0 .2 ε =0 .8 ε =1 .4
Pre-reform
Money metric 0.0177 0.0630 0.1018 0.2186 55,972 54,980 52,444 50,273
Net income 0.0267 0.1008 0.1669 0.2851 27,307 26,577 24,556 22,750
Post-reform
Policy 1
Money metric 0.0177 0.0630 0.1017 0.2184 55,970 54,980 52,446 50,277
Change (%) -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Net income 0.0267 0.1004 0.1663 0.2845 27,303 26,575 24,561 22,761
Change (%) -0.35 -0.35 -0.34 -0.18 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.05
Policy 2
Money metric 0.0177 0.0630 0.1017 0.2184 55,967 54,977 52,444 50,275
Change (%) -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.08 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01
Net income 0.0266 0.1002 0.1661 0.2842 27,294 26,567 24,558 22,761
Change (%) -0.50 -0.51 -0.50 -0.30 -0.05 -0.04 0.01 0.05
Policy 3
Money metric 0.0194 0.0686 0.1100 0.2280 56,047 54,957 52,200 49,882
Change (%) 9.73 8.89 8.02 4.34 0.13 -0.04 -0.47 -0.78
Net income 0.0316 0.1158 0.1876 0.3061 27,632 26,759 24,432 22,447
Change (%) 18.02 14.92 12.42 7.39 1.19 0.69 -0.50 -1.33
Policy 4
Money metric 0.0196 0.0691 0.1107 0.2289 56,216 55,116 52,331 49,991
Change (%) 10.47 9.64 8.76 4.75 0.44 0.25 -0.22 -0.56
Net income 0.0319 0.1170 0.1895 0.3078 27,834 26,946 24,577 22,559
Change (%) 19.26 16.11 13.54 7.97 1.93 1.39 0.09 -0.84
Note: Money metric and net income are per adult equivalent. Social Welfare is the equally
distributed equivalent level of money metric utility or net income.
Measures of social welfare, using the iso-elastic social welfare function associated with the
17On the other hand, if changes at the bottom end of the income range are larger than changes at the
top end, the absolute percentage changes should increase with epsilon.
18use of the Atkinson inequality measure, are given in the last four columns of Table 5. Social
welfare is virtually unchanged under Policies 1 and 2. There is a small decline for the lowest
value of the inequality aversion parameter but at higher levels of relative inequality aversion,
t h es l i g h td e c r e a s ei ni n e q u a l i t yo ﬀsets the minor reduction in aggregate net income, which
results in a very small increase in social welfare.
Similar to the eﬀect on inequality, Policies 3 and 4 also generate much larger changes on
social welfare. Both policies improve social welfare at the lowest level of relative inequal-
ity aversion and the improvements are highest for the measures based on net income. In
contrast, social welfare decreases at the highest level of relative inequality aversion because
the increase in net income (or money metric utility) no longer oﬀsets the widening of the
income distribution suﬃciently.
Policy 4 increases social welfare more (or decreases it to a lesser extent) than Policy 3.
This is due to the additional government expenditure in Policy 4, spending the additional
g o v e r n m e n tr e v e n u eg e n e r a t e db yt h ei n c r e a s ei nl a b o u rs u p p l y ,d u et ot h ea b o l i s h e dt a x -
free threshold and reduced top tax rates, to reduce the top tax rates further. However,
inequality also increases more under Policy 4, because middle- and high-income households
beneﬁt most from the further reduction in the tax rates, increasing the gap between them
and low-income households.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has examined the eﬀects of four alternative policy changes, each involving the
elimination of the tax-free threshold in Australia and designed to achieve approximate rev-
enue neutrality, using the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator. A range of
implications were examined, including labour supply responses to tax changes, and the
eﬀects of policy changes on inequality and social welfare.
The ﬁrst two policies ensure that low-income individuals are fully compensated through
an extension of the Low Income Tax Oﬀset. In addition, the extra revenue raised from higher
incomes as a result of the extension of the tax base was used to reduce the middle (marginal)
income tax rate. Both policies were close to being both revenue neutral and distribution
neutral, with only high-income households experiencing a decrease in net income. As a
result of the small changes, labour supply incentives hardly changed and therefore labour
supply remained nearly the same as before the policy change.
The third and fourth policies also eliminated the tax-free threshold and at the same
time aimed to ﬂatten the marginal tax rate structure. These policies did not compensate
19low-income individuals at all, but instead reduced the top tax rates. Again the policies were
close to revenue neutral (the third policy under ﬁxed labour supply and the fourth after
allowing for labour supply responses) but, as expected, they were no longer distribution
neutral. The lowest-income households are aﬀected the most negatively, and some of the
high-income households are much better oﬀ after the policy change. As a result of the large
changes in net income, large labour supply responses are also observed. Both increases and
decreases are predicted, with the average eﬀect being an increase, and the predominant
eﬀect for low-income individuals also being an increase in labour supply. The cost of this
increased labour supply is higher inequality and a decrease in social welfare when evaluated
at medium to high levels of relative inequality aversion.
The results therefore demonstrate that it is possible to eliminate the tax-free threshold
under approximate overall revenue and distribution neutrality, but that it is impossible
to improve labour supply incentives at the same time. In fact, not much changes in the
ﬁrst two policies which are revenue and distribution neutral. In order to achieve improved
incentives, either revenue or distribution neutrality has to be sacriﬁced.
20Appendix A: The Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer
Simulator
This appendix provides a brief description of the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer
Simulator (MITTS), a behavioural microsimulation model of direct tax and transfers in
Australia. Since the ﬁrst version was completed in 2000, it has undergone a range of
substantial developments. MITTS is based on the Australian Survey of Income and Housing
Costs (SIHC), a representative sample of the Australian population, containing detailed
information on labour supply and income from diﬀerent sources, in addition to a variety of
background characteristics of individuals and households. All results are aggregated to the
population level using the household weights provided with SIHC. Pre-reform net incomes
at alternative hours levels are based on the MITTS calculation of entitlements, not the
actual receipt. Furthermore, MITTS applies only income tests, as there is at present no
asset imputation in the model. All major social security payments and income taxes are
included, ensuring a reasonable approximation to net income.
MITTS consists of two components. MITTS-A is the arithmetic tax and beneﬁtm o d -
elling component and provides, using the wage rate of each individual, the budget constraints
that are crucial for the analysis of behavioural responses to tax changes. For those individ-
uals in the data set who are not working, an imputed wage is obtained. MITTS-B examines
the eﬀects of any speciﬁed tax reform, allowing individuals to adjust their labour supply.
Behaviour is based on quadratic preference functions where the parameters are allowed to
vary with individuals’ characteristics. Individuals are considered as being constrained to
select from a discrete set of hours levels. For singles, 11 discrete points are distinguished.
For couples, two sets of discrete labour supply points are used. The female hours distribu-
tion covers a wider range of part-time and full-time hours than the male distribution, which
is mostly divided between non-participation and full-time work. Therefore, women’s labour
supply is divided into 11 discrete points, whereas men’s labour supply is represented by just
6 points. The joint labour supply of couples is estimated simultaneously, unlike a popular
approach in which female labour supply is estimated with the spouse’s labour supply taken
as exogenous. Thus for couples there are 66 possible joint labour supply combinations.
Simulations are probabilistic, as utility at each hours level is the sum of a determin-
istic component (depending on hours worked and net income) and a random component.
Hence MITTS generates a probability distribution over the discrete hours levels. The self-
employed, disabled, students and those over 65 have their labour supply ﬁxed at observed
21hours. Simulations begin by recording the discrete hours level for each individual that is
closest to the observed hours level. The deterministic component of utility is obtained using
the parameter estimates of the quadratic preference function. To generate the random com-
ponent, a draw is taken from the distribution of the error term for each hours level (an
Extreme Value Type I distribution). The utility-maximising hours level is found by adding
the two components of utility for each hours level and choosing the hours with the highest
utility. Draws from the error terms are taken conditionally on the observed labour supply;
that is, they are taken in such a way that the optimal pre-reform labour supply is equal
to the actually observed labour supply. As a result, post-reform labour supply is simulated
conditional on the observed pre-reform labour supply. A user-speciﬁed number of draws is
produced.
For the post-reform analysis, the new net incomes cause the deterministic component of
utility at each hours level to change, so using the same set of draws from the calibration
stage, a new set of optimal hours of work is produced. This gives rise to a probability
distribution over the set of discrete hours for each individual under the new tax and transfer
structure. Post-reform labour supply is based on the average value over the draws. This is
equivalent to calculating the expected hours of labour supply after the change, conditional
on starting from the observed hours before the change. In computing tax and revenue levels,
an expected value is also obtained after the policy change.
Appendix B: Two Rebates
In Australia, a number of rebates (or oﬀsets) are available to reduce the tax payable for
speciﬁc groups. The rebates can only be used to oﬀset taxes that are payable; they cannot be
paid. Rebates reduce the tax payable by a certain amount rather than the taxable income.
This appendix discusses the two rebates that are most relevant in the four policy changes
analysed in this paper: the Pension Rebate and the Low Income Tax Oﬀset.
B.1: The Low Income Tax Oﬀset
Individuals with annual taxable income below AU$21,600 are entitled to the Low Income
Tax Oﬀset (LITO). The maximum level of the rebate is AU$235 per year and is reduced by
4 cents for every dollar of taxable income above the threshold. Denoting the individual’s
income by y, the annual amount of Low Income Tax Oﬀset is calculated as:
LITO =$ 2 3 5 if y<$21,600
=m a x [ 0 ,$235 − 0.04(y − $21,600)] if y ≥ $21,600 (B.1)
22B2: The Pension Rebate
All recipients of taxable social security and Veterans Aﬀairs service pensions, including the
parenting payment (single), may be eligible for the pensioner rebate. Once taxable income
reaches a threshold of yT the rebate is shaded out at 12.5 cents for each dollar above the
threshold. The maximum rebate level is calculated as the diﬀerence between the threshold
level of income, yT, and the tax-free (or ﬁrst) threshold yTFT (AU$6,000 per year) multiplied
by the lowest marginal tax rate, τL (17 per cent). Thus the maximum rebate, maxPR, is
given by:
maxPR= τL(yT − yTFT) (B.2)
The threshold amount is the sum of the maximum annual base pension payable, PB, plus
the income-free area for the pension per person, PF/n (where n is 1 or 2, depending on
whether the individual is single or partnered). These two amounts diﬀer depending on the
type of pension and the composition of the household. Thus:
yT = PB + PF/n (B.3)
The pensioner rebate is thus calculated as:
PR =m a xPR if y<y T
=m a x [ 0 ,maxPR− 0.125(y − yT)] if y ≥ yT
(B.4)
Partnered pensioners can transfer the unused portion of their rebate to their partner if the
partner has a tax liability. However, the calculation of the unused portion of their rebate
does not take the presence of other rebates into account. If the amount of the Pension
Rebate is less than the amount of income tax to be paid, no transfer takes place.
In the ﬁrst two policies, yTFT is kept at AU$6,000 since the Low Income Tax Oﬀset
takes over the role of the tax free income range for low-income households. The tax rate in
the ﬁrst income range is in eﬀect raised from 0 to 17 per cent, while keeping the ﬁrst tax
threshold, although there is no longer a tax rate change at this level. The problem under
Policy 1 arises because low-income individuals transfer less rebate to their partners, since
they start paying tax from the ﬁrst dollar of earnings. Although the additional tax payment
is compensated by the increased Low Income Tax Oﬀset, the pension rebate calculation does
not take into account this increased Low Income Tax Oﬀset and assumes that the low-income
individual pays enough tax to oﬀset the Pension Rebate against. At the ﬁnal stage of rebate
calculation, when all rebates are added together, there is more rebate than tax payable for
these low-income individuals. As a result, less than the full sum of rebates is paid out and
23the higher income partner does not beneﬁt to the same extent as before from a transfer in
the Pension Rebate, resulting in a decrease in net income.
Appendix C: Welfare Changes in a Discrete Hours Frame-
work
Individuals are restricted to hours levels h1,...,hH and the utility function and net incomes
at each point are known. The optimal number of hours is obtained by calculating utilities at
H points, each of which is treated as a corner solution. Let Uk
j denote utility obtained from
hours level hk and tax and transfer system j. Similar indices are used when referring to the
corresponding virtual non-wage income, μ,a n dv i r t u a lw a g e s ,w,e x c e p tt h a ta na d d i t i o n a l
subscript is needed to refer to the discrete hours level to which the virtual values relate.18
Hence the virtual wage, wk
0,j is the slope of indiﬀerence curve Uk
0 at the discrete hours point
hj. Similarly, μk
0,j is the corresponding virtual non-wage income, which is represented by
the intercept on the net income axis of the tangent to the indiﬀerence curve, Uk
0,a tt h e
discrete hours level hj.
Consider Figure 3, where four discrete hours levels are available. The original optimal
position is at point A on indiﬀerence curve, U3
0, corresponding to h3 hours of work. A tax
reform causes the optimal position to shift to B on indiﬀerence curve U2
1,i n v o l v i n gh2 hours













respectively.19 The standard compensating variation is the
diﬀerence between the net incomes at points D and B, but labour supply between h1 and
h2 hours of work is not available, so U3
0 cannot be reached. In addition, even if the labour
supply point were available, the nonlinearity and nonconvexity of the budget constraint may
make the actual compensation required at this point diﬀerent from the distance between D
and B. At h2 hours of work, at least the diﬀerence between the net incomes at points E and
B is required although it is not necessarily the minimum compensation needed when hours
of work are allowed to vary over the discrete points available. It may be possible to work
hi 6= h2 hours and reach indiﬀerence curve U3
0 with a smaller increase to net income than
the distance BE.
The virtual wage corresponding to h2 at point E on U3
0,a n dμ3
0,2 represents the associated
18Any position can be regarded as being generated by a linear virtual constraint c = wh + μ,w h e r ec is
consumption (assumed to be equal to net income).
19For each hours point, hj, c0
j and c1
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Figure 3: Compensating Variation in Discrete Hours Labour Supply Context
virtual income.20 To determine the compensating variation, the distance between the current
budget constraint and net income required to reach the original utility level U3
0 must be
determined at all labour supply levels. For example, if net income at h1 in system 1 is
at point G (which is above the virtual linear budget constraint associated with B), it is
possible that the distance between G and F is smaller than that between B and E. Even if
G were slightly below the virtual budget line through B, it is possible for the compensating
variation to be lower than if hours were ﬁxed at h2, depending on the distance FH compared
with ED. Point G is the combination of net income on the actual budget constraint under
the post-reform tax system and hours level h1, so the indiﬀerence curve through this point
is labelled U1
1. At G, the compensation required to reach U3


































The appropriate compensation is the minimum of this type of diﬀerence, over all discrete
hours points. This procedure requires only the calculation of net income corresponding to
a speciﬁed hours level and indiﬀerence curve, for a limited number of diﬀerent hours levels.
20Determine c3
0,2 needed to reach U3
0 in h2 by solving for c in U (c,h2)=U3
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